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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Crowd-sourcing is a form of investment model in which a creator or start-
up company makes a promise to investors in return for the funds that are used 
to complete a project.1  Crowd-sourcing is typically facilitated by a website 
based service, such as Kickstarter, that charges an amount based on the total 
amount of funds raised by the creator or start-up.2 
Startups that rely on crowd-sourcing are producing solutions to novel 
challenges.3  Even public entities, such as the U.S. government, are using 
crowd-sourcing to solve economic and scientific problems.4  
Crowd-sourcing may be one manifestation of a brave new world of high 
technology innovation in which markets are no longer defined by economies of 
scale and developed distribution networks.5  Unfortunately, crowd-sourcing and 
similar innovations have come into being at a time when the proliferation of 
high technology patents has made it difficult in some industries to acquire all 
the legal rights necessary to bring new products to the market.6 
In practice, many technology developers ranging from tech giants to public 
researchers deliberately ignore potential infringement issues often fail to run 
patent checks and take no action when confronted with a cease and desist 
letter.7  This pattern may hold for tech startups, which are heavily incentivized 
to ignore potential patent infringement issues.8  
                                                                                                                  
 1 Edmund W. Kitch, Crowdfunding and an Innovator’s Access to Capital, 21 GEO MASON L. REV. 
887, 889–90 (2014) (discussing the nature of crowd-sourcing). 
 2 Welcome Entrepreneurs, INDIEGOGO.COM, https://learn.indiegogo.com/crowdfunding-on-ind 
iegogo/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 3 See Cat Zakrzewski, Thousands Can Fact-Check The News With Grasswire, TECHCRUNCH 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/05/thousands-can-fact-check-the-news-with-
grasswire/ (discussing a new crowd-funding based startup that allows users to check the 
validity of news reports through the use of a search engine). 
 4 See Kyle Russell, The Department of Energy Needs Your Help To Cut The Soft Costs Of Solar, 
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 5, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/11/05/the-department-of-energy-ne 
eds-your-help-to-cut-the-soft-costs-of-solar/ (discussing a U.S. government project with the aim 
of soliciting ideas from entrepreneurs that will provide winners with a $25,000 contribution to 
their crowd-sourcing project). 
 5 Daryl Lim, Beyond Microsoft: Intellectual Property, Peer Production and the Law’s Concern with Market 
Dominance, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 291, 300–01 (2008). 
 6 Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 19–20.  
 7 Id. at 20–21. 
 8 See Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 
898 (2014) (discussing the reasons why startups fail to procure patents); see also Stuart J.H. Graham & 
Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1065, 1086 (2008) for a 
discussion of why some companies acquire patents to protect themselves from patent lawsuits and 
why entrepreneurs may have a disincentive to file for patents to avoid infringement litigation. 
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While many companies and researchers continue to produce new products 
despite the threat of litigation,9 crowd-sourcing sites that partner with tech 
startups may be particularly susceptible to litigation threats because crowd-
sourcing sites may rely on a business model that produces a small profit (five 
percent in Kickstarter’s case)10 from an individual instance of hosting a tech 
startup.  Under this model a very successful technology project may yield 
around $50,000 in profit for Kickstarter,11 but litigation costs to defend against 
a patent lawsuit in lower stakes cases (under $1 million) average over 
$600,000.12  Despite the advantages that crowd-sourcing offers to innovators, 
patent litigation may soon threaten the relationship between crowd-sourcing 
companies and tech startups, specifically through litigation brought under 
§ 271(b) of the Patent Act.13 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Global–Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. may 
cause crowd-sourcing sites to rethink their relationships with tech startups due 
to the implications of the Court’s holding that willful blindness may equate to a 
showing of induced infringement.14  
If a tech startup is found to have committed direct infringement under 
§ 271(a), then it may be possible for legitimate companies and paper-holding 
trolls15 alike to sue the startup’s project sponsors (including crowd-sourcing sites) 
through strategic use of notice under a theory of knowledge or willful blindness.16 
By notifying a crowd-sourcing company of a client startup’s infringement 
(both real and imagined), the company will be placed in the unenviable position 
of deciding between two equally unsatisfactory legal postures.17  The crowd-
sourcing site can ignore the notice and demonstrate willful blindness to possible 
                                                                                                                  
 9 Lemley, supra note 6, at 21–22.  
 10 Start a project, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/learn?ref=nav/ (last visited 
Sept. 13, 2016). 
 11 Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav/ 
(last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 12 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND 
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 131–32 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
 13 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010). 
 14 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2061–63 (2011).  
 15 Maayan Perel, From Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) To Non-Practiced Patents (NPPs): A Proposal 
for a Patent Working Requirement, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 749 (2014) (describing Non-practicing 
entities, or “patent trolls.”  The key defining feature of a patent troll is that it makes money off of 
its patents by litigating, rather than producing products.). 
 16 John David Evered, Inducement of Patent Infringement After Global-Tech and Akami: A Deadly 
Weapon Against New Enabling Technologies?, 23 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 43, 50–52 (2014) (explaining 
how a complaint or letter giving notice of infringement could fix defendant with constructive 
knowledge of infringement and a scicuter of willful blindness). 
 17 Id. 
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infringement, or it can investigate the claim.18  Investigating the claim will only 
provide a defense in subsequent litigation if the defendant’s belief that the 
plaintiff’s patent has not been infringed is deemed reasonable,19 and the 
company may still be required to defend or settle the lawsuit.20  This posture 
pushes the hypothetical crowd-sourcing site away from its original function as 
an enabler of innovation and into the historically problematic role of patent 
insurance21 by forcing a crowd-sourcing platform to evaluate potential startups 
on the basis of litigation risk.  This possibility is problematic because patent 
insurance may be fundamentally unfeasible due to the costs involved and the 
difficulty of ascertaining patent rights.22  Neither of these outcomes is desirable 
in a society where technological innovation and judicial efficiency have been 
enthroned as paramount values.23 
Part II of this Note will set up the discussion regarding crowd-sourcing sites 
and induced infringement by examining the legal dispute between the company 
3D Systems and the startup Formlabs.  This dispute provides relevant context 
because Formlabs began its life as a crowd-sourcing project on Kickstarter, and 
Kickstarter was briefly a co-defendant under a theory of induced 
infringement.24  Part II will also explain the reasons that this suit, which 
concluded with Kickstarter dodging all liability for induced infringement, may 
not be representative of the pattern that future litigation will take.  Part II will 
also examine the unique legal position of the plaintiff 3D Systems, and the 
variety of possible plaintiffs that might want to sue a crowd-sourcing company 
for induced infringement.  
In Part III, this Note will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in Global-
Tech and how the Supreme Court’s clarification of the mens rea requirement of 
§ 271(b) of the Patent Act places crowd-sourcing companies in a precarious 
legal position.  This Part will analyze how the actual knowledge requirement will 
be an easy bar for plaintiffs to meet through the strategic use of notice and the 
broad utilization of circumstantial evidence in patent litigation.  Part III will also 
                                                                                                                  
 18 Id.  
 19 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015).  See BESSEN & MEURER, 
supra note 12, at 48–50 for a discussion and examples of why it may be bad business strategy to 
investigate the validity of technology patents. 
 20 See Evered, supra note 16, at 52–53. 
 21 See J. Rodrigo Fuentes, Patent Insurance: Towards a More Affordable, Mandatory Scheme?, 10 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 267, 268–70, 283–89 (2009) (describing the traditional problems 
associated with patent insurance). 
 22 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 12, at 53–54. 
 23 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and Useful Arts” by granting intellectual property rights). 
 24 3D Sys., Inc. v. Formlabs, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 7973, 2014 WL 1904365, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 
12, 2014). 
4
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss1/9
2016] INSURING FAILURE  183 
 
analyze crowd-sourcing companies’ potential liability under the willful blindness 
standard the Court outlined.  This Part will include a brief overview of some of 
the problems inherent in importing the willful blindness standard to patent law.  
In Part IV, this Note will suggest that the problems arising from the litigation 
of induced infringement claims may force crowd-sourcing sites to adopt a model 
of behavior that is analogous to patent insurance.  Part IV will examine the 
reasons patent insurance has traditionally failed and will link these failures to the 
high level of uncertainty that is generated by the patent system itself. 
In Part V, this Note will summarize the issues facing crowd-sourcing sites.  
Part V will conclude that the Global-Tech standard may create an undesirable 
result in the context of crowd-sourcing.  
II.  3D SYSTEMS VERSUS FORMLABS AND KICKSTARTER 
In 2012, established 3D printing company 3D Systems submitted a claim for 
patent infringement in South Carolina state court against tech startup Formlabs 
and crowd-sourcing site Kickstarter.25  Soon thereafter, 3D Systems voluntarily 
dismissed the suit against both companies only to refile exclusively against 
Formlabs in the Southern District of New York.26  While the initial South 
Carolina state action was still active, 3D Systems and Formlabs attempted to 
settle the dispute.27  Although 3D Systems and Formlabs were unable to resolve 
their differences during the initial talks, the New York federal action ultimately 
settled, and Formlabs consented to a licensing agreement.28  
The result of this litigation appears to demonstrate the legal system working 
at its best: Formlabs was able to bring an innovative and cost-effective new 
product to the market, and 3D Systems’ property rights were validated.29  3D 
Systems even acknowledged that the dispute changed its entire view of IP 
litigation, and Kickstarter dodged all the potential negative legal consequences.30  
                                                                                                                  
 25 Michael Weinberg, 3DP IP Wars Update: Formlabs to pay 3D Systems sales royalties, 
MAKEZINE.COM, http://makezine.com/2014/12/03/3dp-ip-wars-update-formlabs-to-pay-3d-sys 
tems-sales-royalties/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (noting not only that the case represented the 
first time a 3D printing manufacturer sued another 3D printing manufacturer, but also that many 
aspects of the litigation were captured on film by a documentary film crew). 
 26 3D Sy., Inc. v. Formlabs, Inc., No. 13 CIV. 7973, 2014 WL 1904365, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 
2014). 
 27 Sean Higgins, 3D Systems gets 6-month stay for settlement talks over patent lawsuit, SPAR 3D, http:// 
www.sparpointgroup.com/news/3d-systems-gets-6-month-stay-for-settlement-talks-over-patent-
lawsuit (last visited Sept. 13, 2016). 
 28 Weinberg, supra note 25. 
 29 See sources cited infra note 46.   
 30 See sources cited infra note 50. 
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3D Systems, Inc. v. Formlabs, Inc. concluded on a seemingly positive note, but 
future cases may come out quite differently.  Potential plaintiffs considering 
patent litigation must consider their own strategic objectives within a complex 
set of situational variables that depend on the context surrounding the legal 
proceedings.31  3D Systems, the plaintiff in this case, may have found itself in a 
position that does not necessarily characterize all potential litigants.  Given the 
small overall profit that crowd-sourcing sites may derive from a single project,32 
it may be that litigation threats from both legitimate companies and patent trolls 
will force crowd-sourcing sites to screen and evaluate projects more thoroughly. 
Two primary forms of litigation threats may impact a crowd-sourcing 
company’s relationship with startups.  First, a legitimate company may 
determine that its interests would be best served by seeking damages rather than 
a license.33  Companies may perceive the negative aspects of licensing as 
limiting the expected rents the company can collect from other companies in 
similar licensing arrangements, a reduction in possible damages in future 
actions, and the promotion of future litigation.34 
A legitimate company might even attempt to use its patents as offensive 
tools to prevent the emergence of competitors that rely on crowd-sourcing for 
capital.35  Such a company may have good reason to sue the crowd-sourcing site 
in conjunction with its startup client.  By suing the crowd-sourcing platform, a 
litigating company may attempt to discipline crowd-sourcing providers and 
make clear that aiding the development of competitors will be met with legal 
consequences.36 
Secondly, crowd-sourcing sites may face legal threats from patent trolls, 
companies that hold patents for the purpose of making money through litigation 
threats rather than by producing actual products.37  Patent trolls often have very 
different incentives and strategic motivations than legitimate companies:  
Their ability to make money licensing has depended on their 
willingness to litigate.  In some situations, these companies have 
adopted a strategy of litigating to obtain damages rather than 
                                                                                                                  
 31 See generally JOHN W. SCHLICHER, SETTLEMENT OF PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTES: 
IMPROVING DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS TO SETTLE AND LICENSE (2011) (discussing economic 
modeling techniques used in patent litigation settlements). 
 32 See Kickstarter Stats, supra note 10.  
 33 SCHLICHER, supra note 31, at 78–79, 119–24. 
 34 Id. at 119–23. 
 35 See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 8, at 1068.  
 36 See id. 
 37 Perel, supra note 15. 
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licensing on the theory that the net profits from litigating would 
exceed the net profits from licensing even with the attendant risk.38  
The most common form of troll typically relies on suing several parties over 
the same patent issue.39  For this reason, it would be consistent for a troll to sue 
a crowd-sourcing company, both to bring an additional defendant and because 
the crowd-sourcing company may have deeper pockets than its startup client.40  
The most common form of troll relies on the fact that it is almost always 
cheaper to settle a patent lawsuit than to defend.41 
“Super Trolls” pose an even more disturbing threat to the relationship 
between crowd-sourcing companies and startups may come from so called 
“super trolls.”  Super trolls are distinguished from traditional trolls by two key 
characteristics.  First, super trolls tend to purchase patents for innovative 
technologies from companies that fail42 and therefore may be more likely to 
target companies that are involved in emerging technology fields.  Second, 
super trolls are generally legally sophisticated and tend to litigate in order to 
achieve the maximum amount of recovery.43  
3D Systems’s claim was inherently different from the kinds of actions that 
could threaten the relationship between crowd-sourcing companies and 
startups.  At the time of litigation, 3D Systems’s patents were on the verge of 
expiration.44  3D Systems may have realized that it would be unable to use 
patent litigation as a bludgeon to remove the threat of competition.45  This 
proposition is reinforced by the fact that Formlabs and 3D Systems were not 
competing in the same market;46 for these reasons, even successful litigation 
                                                                                                                  
 38 SCHLICHER, supra note 31, at 172. 
 39 John P. Hanish, Effectively Defending Against Patent Trolls And The Effects Of Increasing Troll 
Litigation On Patent Law And Patent Dispute Procedures, in THE IMPACT OF RECENT PATENT LAW 
CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS, 2014 EDITION: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING CHANGING 
STANDARDS, REVIEWING NEW CASE LAW, AND UPDATING CLIENT STRATEGIES 5 (Thomson 
Reuters/Aspatore 2014), 2013 WL 6683686, at *5. 
 40 See O’Connor, supra note 8, at 898 (noting the fact that many tech startups have no revenue 
during their first few years of existence). 
 41 See Hanish, supra note 39, at 5–6. 
 42 See id. at 10.  
 43 Id.  
 44 Curt Woodward, Formlabs to Pay 8 Percent of Net Sales in Patent Lawsuit Settlement, XCONOMY 
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.xconomy.com/boston/2014/12/04/formlabs-to-pay-8-percent-of-
net-sales-in-patent-lawsuit-settlement/. 
 45 See Lim, supra note 5, at 292–93, for a discussion of how intellectual property may be used 
to bar competitors from market entry.  
 46 Signe Brewster, Formlabs, 3D Systems settle their 3D printing patent battle, GIGAOM (Dec. 1, 2014, 
5:20 PM), https://gigaom.com/2014/12/01/formlabs-3d-systems-settle-their-3d-printing-patent-
battle/ (discussing the proposition that Formlabs created an entirely new market); see Brian C. 
Bianco, A Five-Point Plan for Creating an Effective Patent Litigation Strategy, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
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would have yielded no long-term advantage.  A technology giant possessing 
newer patents or facing competition from upstart competitors may find that 
suing a crowd-sourcing company could be in its best interests.  However, this 
posture will not be practical for firms that are unwilling to pursue extremely 
expensive and difficult litigation.47 
Additionally, the rapid decay of 3D Systems’s patents may have changed its 
calculus regarding the advantages of a licensing agreement.  With only a few 
years left on its patents,48 a licensing agreement may have been highly appealing 
to 3D Systems.  
3D Systems’s expected damages may have been too low to justify pursuing a 
claim against Kickstarter.  A recent trend in patent cases involves calculating 
damages based on a more nuanced approach than the entire market value 
(EMV) of the infringing product.49  In this case, Formlabs’s product was the 
first of its kind and represented a truly unique innovation.50  This fact could 
skew a potential recovery toward a lower amount, making damages far less 
attractive in the context of bringing in another defendant who may be more 
legally sophisticated.   
Finally, 3D Systems’s behavior may be attributable to a novel IP strategy.51  
These factors jointly suggest that in the context of 3D Systems’s dispute with 
Formlabs, 3D Systems may have simply found it inconvenient to sue or settle 
with Kickstarter.  It does not necessarily follow, however, that this pattern will 
hold true in every case.  Legitimate companies and trolls alike may be able to 
take advantage of the Global Tech standard and force crowd-sourcing companies 
to change their behavior regarding which startups they sponsor. 
III.  GLOBAL TECH 
Until 2011 when the Supreme Court decided the case of Global Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., § 271(b) of the Patent Act had languished under a 
                                                                                                                  
FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES, 2013 EDITION: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING KEY 
DECISIONS AND EFFECTIVELY LITIGATING IP CASES 2 (Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2013), 2013 
WL 2951773, at *2 (discussing the importance of understanding the market relationship of 
adverse patent litigants).  
 47 Geoffrey D. Aurini & Bryan K. Wheelock, Evaluating and Addressing the Complexities of Various 
Intellectual Property Cases, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES, 2015 
EDITION: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING KEY DECISIONS AND EFFECTIVELY LITIGATING IP 
CASES 1, 5 (Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2015), 2015 WL 4975035, at *1, *5 (discussing the strategic 
implications of using patent litigation to remove competition). 
 48 Woodward, supra note 44. 
 49 Aurini & Wheelock, supra note 47. 
 50 Brewster, supra note 46. 
 51 See Weinberg, supra note 25.  
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veil of uncertainty concerning its mens rea requirement.52  In Global Tech, the 
Supreme Court finally illuminated this area of law by holding that § 271(b) of 
the Patent Act requires knowledge, rather than negligence or recklessness.53  In 
adopting the knowledge requirement, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
Federal Circuit’s position that deliberate indifference to the known risk of 
infringement may satisfy the requirements of § 271(b).54 
However, the Court did not stop at merely discrediting the “affirmative 
indifference” standard, but also held that willful blindness could satisfy the mens 
rea requirement.55  The Court reasoned that this standard was necessary to 
prevent defendants from “deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence 
of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the circumstances.”56  
The Court articulated the willful blindness standard: 
(1) The defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high 
probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take 
deliberate steps to avoid learning of that fact.  We think these 
requirements give willful blindness an appropriately limited scope 
that surpasses recklessness and negligence.  Under this formulation, 
a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to 
avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can 
almost be said to have known the critical facts.57 
This standard clearly encompasses the bad faith behavior of the Global Tech 
defendant, which manipulated its patent search process to avoid detecting the 
existence of the plaintiff’s patent.58  Given that a variety of actors completely 
ignore patents to cut costs,59 what remains unclear is whether failure to conduct a 
patent search can constitute willful blindness. The requirements of the 
willful blindness standard are further obscured by the doctrine’s status in the 
circuit courts and the specific facts of Global Tech.  First, as Justice Kennedy 
alluded to in his dissent, by importing the willful blindness standard into patent 
                                                                                                                  
 52 Kristen M. Hagen, EYES WIDE SHUT: Induced Patent Infringement and the Willful Blindness 
Standard, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 306–08 (2013) (describing the history of the 
judicial interpretation of § 271(b) of the Patent Act). 
 53 Global Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068, 2070 (2011). 
 54 Id. at 2071. 
 55 Id. at 2068–69, 2071. 
 56 Id. at 2068–69. 
 57 Id. at 2070–71. 
 58 Id.  
 59 See Lemley, supra note 6, at 20–22. 
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law, the Court really imported multiple standards that vary to a degree.60  Second, 
although the Court found the evidence in Global Tech to be more than sufficient 
to support a finding of willful blindness, the overall passive nature of the 
defendant’s actions in Global Tech makes it questionable as to whether the willful 
blindness standard is truly as stringent as the Court claimed.61  Finally, the Court 
did not elaborate on what constitutes a “high probability of” wrongdoing.62 
A more general issue regarding the Global Tech standard is that proving 
knowledge is, as a practical matter, fairly easy as patent litigation regularly involves 
circumstantial evidence and the inference of facts.63  In the context of patent 
litigation, the existence of a notice letter alone is strong evidence of knowledge.64  
Under a knowledge and willful blindness standard, a potential litigant could 
place a crowd-sourcing company on notice that one of the company’s clients is 
infringing and thereby generate knowledge of the patent.65  Even if the claim is 
illegitimate, the fact-driven analysis inherent in the knowledge standard can 
impede the company’s ability to dismiss the lawsuit or achieve summary 
judgment.66  
The inability to escape litigation in this scenario may be likely to occur despite 
the Court’s opinion in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc., which noted that 
federal court judges are authorized to dismiss “frivolous” patent law suits.67  The 
Commil opinion stated that a patent is presumed valid until proven otherwise.68  
The implication is that it may be unclear that a particular suit is frivolous without 
fact-driven discovery or a request for reexamination by the USPTO.  
Entities like patent trolls may be able to take advantage of the Global Tech 
standard to place crowd-sourcing companies and startups in a precarious legal 
position.  If this kind of litigation becomes common, then crowd-sourcing 
companies may be forced to screen potential startups for litigation risks.  This 
additional evaluation could force crowd-sourcing companies into a position 
                                                                                                                  
 60 See Jeremy Adler, See No Evil: How the Supreme Court’s Decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. 
v. SEB S.A. Further Muddles the Intent Element of Induced Infringement, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 569–71 (2013) (discussing of how the willful blindness doctrine is not universally accepted, 
how the Global Tech standard is unclear regarding what version of willful blindness the Court 
intended, and how the Global Tech standard muddles the different rationales of punishment that 
exist in the criminal and patent law contexts); Hagen, supra note 52, at 315–18 (for a discussion of 
the possible interpretations of the Global Tech standard).  
 61 See Adler, supra note 60, at 572. 
 62 Id. at 571–72. 
 63 Evered, supra note 16, at 45, 48, 50–52. 
 64 Id. at 50. 
 65 See id. 
 66 Id. at 52–53. 
 67 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930–31 (2015). 
 68 Id. at 1928–29.  
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analogous to patent insurance, in effect, causing crowd-sourcing companies to 
evaluate and bet on the risks attached to their startup partners. 
IV.  HOW CROWD-SOURCING COMPANIES MAY BE FORCED INTO THE ROLE 
OF PATENT INSURANCE 
With patent insurance, the insured pays an insurer a fee with the expectation 
that in the event of patent litigation, the insurance company will pay out a sum 
that allows the insured to properly litigate the claim.69  The two types of patent 
insurance are generally distinguished by the type of litigation they cover.  
Offensive patent insurance pays out in the event that the insured needs to 
litigate a claim against an infringer, while defensive patent insurance covers the 
possibility that a company will be sued for patent infringement.70  Defensive 
patent insurance presents the best model for understanding the dilemma faced 
by crowd-sourcing companies in induced infringement actions because 
plaintiffs targeting crowd-sourcing companies for induced infringement 
inherently place those companies in the position of analyzing the cost of 
defending against a claim. 
In theory, patent insurance should provide a cost-effective method of 
managing the uncertainty inherent in the costs of patent litigation, but for many 
reasons, patent insurance has traditionally proven to be cost ineffective and 
prohibitively expensive.71  This expense is in part related to the cost of 
ascertaining the likelihood that a client is a litigation risk.72  If crowd-sourcing 
companies are forced to evaluate clients in a similar fashion, then the selection 
process used by these companies may become skewed against startups. 
Only one percent of patents are ever likely to be infringed, but the risk 
assessment process is expensive and riddled with uncertainty.73  While it is true 
that insurance companies providing patent insurance may have good reason to 
suspect that their potential clients are more likely to infringe,74 crowd-sourcing 
sites may suspect that potential startups are susceptible to infringement actions 
due to the inability of most startups to procure patents for defensive use.  If 
crowd-sourcing sites are forced to bear the cost of induced infringement 
actions, then their priorities in the project application and assessment portion of 
their business may become more expansive and expensive due to the inclusion 
of enhanced litigation risk management.  The costs associated with betting on 
                                                                                                                  
 69 Fuentes, supra note 21, at 267–68. 
 70 Id. at 269.  
 71 Id. at 283–89. 
 72 Id. at 287–89.  
 73 Id. at 288. 
 74 Id. 
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the validity of patent rights by crowd-sourcing companies may produce a 
reciprocal effect resulting in the under-utilization of crowd-sourcing by startups. 
By their nature, patents present complications and uncertainties about risk.  
The failure of patent insurance may be linked to the general failure of patent 
rights to perform with the same efficiency as tangible property.75  While the 
institutions governing tangible property regimes provide clear notice of 
property boundaries, patents often (1) have unpredictable boundaries that can 
only be resolved through litigation (particularly in fast-paced technology 
sectors), (2) have obscured claim language crucial to understanding the 
parameters of the boundaries, and (3) require an assessor to check against a vast 
and fragmented collection of other competing rights.76  These factors make 
patent insurance costly.  A typical defensive patent insurance policy may cost 
more than $13,000 a year. 77  
Imposing these costs on crowd-sourcing companies may stifle innovation.  
Some might regard such a change in the way crowd-sourcing companies do 
business as a natural part of the trade-off inherent in the patent system.  
nevertheless, the change is distressing because this failure may result from a lack 
of clarity and uncertainty that the patent system itself has perpetuated.  Crowd-
sourcing sites, which have proven themselves socially beneficial engines of 
innovation, should not be shackled to the unfortunate shortcomings of the 
patent system. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
As crowd-sourcing sites become increasingly popular platforms for small tech 
startups, other actors may seek to exert their patent rights when infringement 
inevitably occurs.  While this is the intended function of the patent system, the 
side effect of holding crowd-sourcing companies liable under § 271(b) may well 
change the way these companies evaluate the projects they support.  The Global 
Tech standard may impose costs on crowd-sourcing companies that resemble 
those found in the patent insurance market.  This shift represents a cost to 
innovation which is at odds with the entire rationale of intellectual property: the 
development of more ideas.  The changing nature of technology innovation and 
patent litigation may force courts and policy makers to reconsider how liability for 
induced infringement should be allocated in the future. 
                                                                                                                  
 75 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 12, at 52–54. 
 76 Id. 
 77  Fuentes, supra note 21, at 284. 
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